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The Excludability of Employment Discrimination
Awards under Code Section 104(a)(2) after
Burke v. United States and Commissioner v. Schleier
Leandra Lederman Gassenheimer
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code carves out an exception
from the broad income inclusion of section 61 for "the amount of any
damages received (whether by suit or by agreement and whether as lump
sums or periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." 1
The exclusion of damages under this section is particularly important in
framing claims and structuring settlements. 2  Until the Supreme Court's
decision in Commissioner v. Schleier3 this past June, courts had become
increasingly generous in allowing exclusion under section 104(a)(2) of
recoveries for a multitude of harms, including employment discrimination on
the basis of age, race, or gender. In Schleier, the Court denied the taxpayer
exclusion of all damages recovered for a claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA") 4 because they were not recovered "on
account of personal injuries or sickness." 5  The Schleier decision was
particularly surprising in that it gives short shrift to a test the Court
* Assistant Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law of Mercer University. The
author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and suggestions of Mark Wright Cochran,
Gregg Grauer, Mark Jones, Hal Lewis, Filiz Serbes, and Lawrence Zelenak. The author also
appreciates the excellent research assistance of Suzanne Causey and Jeanne Strickland.
1. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1996). Unless otherwise indicated, Code Section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
2. See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., 1 LITIGATING CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES, § 7.27a, at 404 (West, 1996) ("Plaintiffs are, of course, more inclined to
settle for less if they are persuaded that the proceeds of a settlement will not be taxed."); Nicole M.
Mosesian, How to Avoid Unfavorable Tax Consequences for Your Personal Injury Client's
Settlement or Judgment, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 343, 343 (1994/95); Andrew M. Wright,
Commissioner v. Schleier: An Approach for Interpreting the Exclusion Under I.R.C. Section
104(a)(2) of Awards or Settlements in Federal Employment Discrimination Claims, 70 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 991, 1030 (1995).
3. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1985).
5. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2164.
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established only three years earlier in United States v. Burke.6 As a result,
Schleier has caused confusion regarding the tax treatment of awards under
employment discrimination statutes other than ADEA.
This article analyzes the law on the tax treatment of employment
discrimination damages. It attempts to reconcile Burke and Schleier and
thereby provide guidance for the future. In Part II, the article discusses the
historical development of the exclusion for damages received on account of
nonphysical, business-related injuries. In Part III, the article discusses the
development of the law with respect to the exclusion of employment
discrimination damages under section 104(a)(2). Part III criticizes the
Supreme Court's decision in Burke for deciding the excludability of awards
recovered under the pre-1991 version of Title VII on overly narrow grounds,
and then looks at the effects of Burke on the application of section 104(a)(2)
to other employment discrimination statutes. Part III also criticizes the
approach taken in Schleier. Part IV looks at the implications for the future.
In Part V, the article concludes that, despite the two Supreme Court
decisions, Congressional action may be needed to clarify the area.
II. PERSONAL INJURIES: DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
The employment discrimination cases under section 104(a)(2) developed
out of a historical exclusion of damages received on account of personal
injuries. For employment discrimination damages to be excludable,
nonphysical, business-related injuries must be considered "personal
injuries." In order to understand the current tax treatment of employment
discrimination damages, it is helpful to understand the history and rationale
of the personal injury exclusion and its application to nonphysical,
professional injuries.
The first codification of the law on personal injury damages occurred in
1918. The statute provided that gross income did not include:
Amounts received, through accident or health insurance or under
workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal
injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received
whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or
sickness .... 7
6. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
7. I.R.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918).
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This was a codification of the law at the time, rather than a change in the
law. 8  At that time, the rationale for the exclusion of personal injury
damages rested on a theory of conversion of capital, with the human body
considered a form of capital. 9 That is, damages were considered to "make
whole" the injured taxpayer. 10 Accordingly, in 1920, the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") opined that the exclusion applied only to damages for
physical injuries. 2
The Supreme Court's decision in Eisner v. Macomber' changed the
development of the law with respect to damages. In Macomber, in the
context of a stock dividend, the Court defined income as "the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined." 13 At the time, Macomber
was thought to represent the constitutional boundary on the definition of
income. Based in part on Macomber, the IRS determined that damages for
"slander or libel of personal character" were excludable. 14
In 1955, the Supreme Court held in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass that
Macomber "was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income
questions."0 5  Instead, the Court focused on "accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion," and found
that punitive damages awarded in an antitrust suit were gross income." This
approach includes most receipts not specifically exempted by statute. It
should also bring into question administrative opinions that exclude damages
8. J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal
Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13, 14 (1989); see also Mark W.
Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43, 44
(1987). The Ways and Means Committee Report accompanying § 213(b)(6) explained that it was
doubtful under the current law whether such amounts were required to be included in gross income.
H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918) (the Ways and Means Committee Report).
9. S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920).
10. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927). This theory has been
"roundly criticized." Robert C. Illig, Note, Tort Reform and the Tax Code: An Opportunity to
Narrow the Personal Injuries Exemption, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1485 (1995). One problem with
this theory is that the taxpayer does not have a basis in human capital. Cochran, supra note 8, at
45-46; see also Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J.,
dissenting).
Another rationale for § 104(a)(2) is that the taxpayer who benefits from the use of his or her
body is not taxed on such imputed income, so the taxpayer who is compensated for personal injury
should similarly not be taxed. One commentator correctly disputes the comparison, pointing out
that the rationale for not taxing imputed income is the difficulty of defining and measuring it and
that damage awards pose no such difficulty. Illig, supra, at 1465.
11. S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 71 (1920).
12. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
13. Id. at 207.
14. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 93-94 (1922).
15. 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
16. Id.
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from income on the theory that they do not meet the Macomber definition of
income. However, the courts did :not question the reasoning of the pre-
Glenshaw Glass authorities. 17 For example, in 1972, the Tax Court relied in
part on the 1922 IRS ruling on damages for defamation of personal character
to decide that the injuries encompassed by section 104(a)(2) need not be
physical. 18
The physical versus nonphysical injury distinction did not address a
possible contrast between "personal" injuries and "business" injuries. Even
under a conversion of capital theory, an exclusion of lost business income
seems to make the taxpayer more than whole (unlike imputed income from
use of one's body) 19 because the income would have been taxed absent the
injury. The 1922 IRS opinion, which allowed exclusion of damages for
defamation of personal character, expressly did not consider or decide
whether damages to professional reputation were excludable. The opinion
even stated that an earlier memorandum holding that damages recovered for
libel were includable may have been correct with respect to damages
received for libel of professional reputation.
21
Similarly, in 1982, when the Tax Court first considered a libel suit that
resulted in lost income and business opportunities, it drew a distinction
between such "business injuries" and "personal injuries" and concluded that
the full amount of the compensatory damages received by the taxpayer was
22includable in his gross income. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a distinction between injuries to
personal and professional reputation was not justified under section
23104(a)(2). The court found that the amount of damages recovered for lost
income was excludable.
24
In 1986, the Tax Court reconsidered its holding on damages to
professional reputation. In Threlkeld v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
followed the Ninth Circuit's approach, allowing exclusion of the settlement
17. One commentator notes, "In effect, authorities relying on the pre-Glenshaw Glass
definition of gross income have been grafted onto the statutory exclusion." Mark W. Cochran,
Special Report, 1989 Tax Act Compounds Confusion Over Tax Status of Personal Injury Damages,
49 TAX NOTES 1565, 1568 (Dec. 31, 1990).
18. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972) (holding damages received for
embarrassment, mental strain, and injury to personal reputation excludable under § 104(a)(2)).
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
20. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92, 93-94 (1922).
21. Id. at 93.
22. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398, 405, 407 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir.
1983).
23. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983).
24. Id. at 696.
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amount allocated to damages to professional reputation.25 The Tax Court
expressly found no distinction between physical and emotional injuries or
between injury to personal reputation and injury to professional reputation.
In deciding Threlkeld, the Tax Court held that the proper inquiry is the
"origin and character of the claim," not "the consequences of the injury." 26
According to the court, even if lost income is the best measure of damages,
that does not change the character of the claim. To characterize the claim in
that case, the court focused on the taxpayer's complaint and found that the
cause of action was malicious prosecution, which would be classified as a
personal injury cause of action under applicable state law. On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, adopting the reasoning of the Ninth
27Circuit.
III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CHARACTER OF THE CLAIM
The Threlkeld decision paved the way for employment discrimination
damages cases. First, Threlkeld characterized lost income as a mere
"measure" of damages, undercutting the argument that the damages replaced
otherwise includable income. Second, Threlkeld made no distinction
between physical and nonphysical injuries, or between professional and
nonprofessional injuries. Third, Threlkeld focused on the "character" of the
claim, an amorphous test. This enabled courts to decide employment
discrimination cases in favor of taxpayers, despite the fact that a large
28
component of an employment discrimination award may be back pay.
Courts were nonetheless concerned about the exclusion of back pay
awards. In some cases where taxpayers had recovered back wages and other
damages under a single anti-discrimination statute, courts bifurcated the
damages into a taxable "contractual" component (back pay) and a nontaxable
25. 87 T.C. 1294, 1298 (1986). Threlkeld was appealable to the Sixth Circuit under I.R.C.
§ 7482(b). The Tax Court follows a Court of Appeals decision that is squarely on point, when
appeal lies to that court alone. See Golsen v. Commissioner 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff'd, 445
F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). When that appellate court has not
yet expressed a view, the Tax Court applies its own view. See id.
26. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299.
27. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
28. See, e.g., Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991)
(addressing a claim based on ADEA); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990)
(similarly addressing an ADEA claim ); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990) (also
addressing an ADEA claim); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834 (1987) (addressing a § 1983
claim), aff'd without published op., 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
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"tortious" component (often the portion the underlying statute termed
"liquidated damages"). 29
ADEA is an example of a statute offering both back pay and liquidated
damages; under ADEA, a victim of willful discrimination is entitled to
"liquidated damages" in an amount equal to the back pay awarded. 30 In
1989, the Tax Court decided its first ADEA damages case, Rickel v.
Commissioner.3 1 Following earlier cases involving other anti-discrimination
statutes, the Tax Court distinguished between the two types of damages
awarded and held only the wage-related damages taxable.32 The court found
that liquidated damages were excludable from income under section
104(a)(2) as damages received for personal injuries. 33 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, allowing exclusion of all of the
damages on the theory that the nature of an age discrimination claim is
personal injury. 3
4
A. Burke v. United States: Tort-Like Personal Injuries
Like ADEA claims, Title VII claims proved difficult to characterize.
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII, back pay was the
only monetary remedy provided. 35 The Courts of Appeals divided on the
issue of whether such back pay awards were excludable under section
104(a)(2). In Burke v. United States, the Sixth Circuit held that prohibited
discrimination was a form of personal injury, so any damages received were
excludable under the statute. Other courts held that back pay, which would
have been taxed if received when earned, was includable because it was not
"compensation for loss due to a tort." 37
29. Rickel v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510, 522 (1989) (reviewed by the full Tax Court and
addressing a claim based upon ADEA), rev'd, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990); Thompson v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 632, 649-50 (1987) (addressing a claim based upon the Equal Pay Act),
aff'd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1984); see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1984).
31. 92 T.C. 510 (1989), rev'd, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
32. See, e.g., Thompson, 89 T.C. 632.
33. Rickel, 92 T.C. at 522.
34. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 663-64.
35. The statute also provided equitable relief. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261 (1964).
36. 929 F.2d 1119, 1122 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
37. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1126 (Wellford, J., dissenting); see also Sparrow v. Commissioner,
949 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir.
1989).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Burke and
reversed. 38  Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun focused on what
constitutes a "personal injury" for purposes of section 104(a)(2). 39  The
phrase is not defined in the statute, but a regulation defines the term
"damages received (whether by suit or by agreement)" as "an amount
received ... through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or
tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of
such prosecution. The meaning of the regulation is far from clear.
Although the regulation purports to define only "damages received," it
echoes much of the language of section 104(a)(2). In fact, the phrase "tort
or tort type rights" seems to parallel the statutory phrase "personal injuries
or sickness," in effect defining it. The IRS had interpreted the regulation
that way for many years, 41 and the Burke majority did the same. 42
Thus, Justice Blackmun formulated the "personal injury" question as
whether a Title VII action is a prosecution of "tort or tort type rights,"
similar to Threlkeld's focus on the origin and character of the claim. Having
done so, Justice Blackmun stated that "one of the hallmarks of traditional tort
liability is the availability of a broad range of damages . . . . "4 According
to the Court, a claim under a law, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, that provides a
broad range of damages including emotional distress, pain and suffering, and
punitive damages, is sufficiently tort-like for its violation to constitute a
personal injury. 44 The Court concluded that before the 1991 amendments,
Title VII claims failed to qualify as sufficiently tort-like to justify exclusion
of back pay because Title VII did not provide a broad range of damages.
45
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Burke reflect the split in views
on the meaning of section 104(a)(2) in general, and how to characterize
employment discrimination statutes in particular. Justice O'Connor's dissent
focused on her view that discrimination in the workplace causes personal
injury .46 She argued that Title VII rights are tort-type rights; echoing
Threlkeld, she argued that "the remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs do
not fix the character of the right they seek to enforce. 4 7 Although the
38. Burke v. United States, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
39. Id. at 234.
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1995).
41. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 242 n. 1 (Scalia, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 234.
43. Id. at 235.
44. Id. at 240.
45. Id. at 238, 241. The damages available under the pre-1991 version of Title VII were
back pay and equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1990).
46. Burke, 504 U.S. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
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majority noted that the amounts awarded as back pay would have been taxed
had they been received as wages, Justice O'Connor pointed out that other
victims of personal injuries can receive damages measured by lost income
and still exclude those damages under section 104(a)(2) .48
Justice Scalia wrote a compelling concurrence, arguing that section
104(a)(2) should be interpreted narrowly to apply only to injuries to physical
and mental health.4 9 He argued that the IRS's formulation of "tort-type
rights" was "not within the range of reasonable interpretation of the statutory
text" and need not be accepted. 50 In his interpretation, the close association
of the phrase "personal injuries" with the word "sickness," and the context
of the use of the phrase "personal injuries or sickness" elsewhere in section
104(a) show an intent to limit the exclusion to injuries to physical or mental
health.5' Justice Scalia also argued that the damages received by the
taxpayer were not received "on account of" injuries to her physical or
mental health since Title VII did not require her to make a showing of
psychological harm in order to recover back pay. 52  Justice Souter also
concurred in the judgment, reasoning that the limitation in Title VII of back
pay as the sole money damages reflected an action that was more contractual
than tort-like.53
B. The Effects of Burke on Other Employment Discrimination Statutes
Burke was a problematic decision. Characterizing the claim as a whole
based on the realm of theoretically available damages could lead to absurd
results in that a taxpayer who recovered exclusively back pay under a
suitably "tort-like" statute could exclude the recovery, whereas a recovery
under a less tort-like statute would be includable.5a In addition, despite the
arguable similarity of Title VII to other federal anti-discrimination in
employment statutes, Burke's holding of taxability was not generalizable
outside of pre-1991 Title VII, so it required judicial decisions on every
employment discrimination statute. As a result, the IRS and courts
considered awards under various statutes on an ad hoc basis. In Revenue
48. Id. at 252.
49. Id. at 243-44 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 242.
51. Id. at 244.
52. Id. at 245.
53. Id. at 247-48 (Souter, J., concurring).
54. Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment Discrimination
Recoveries Under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital, Realization, and
Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 549, 617 (1994).
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Ruling 93-88, 55 the IRS opined that recoveries under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") were excludable and that both the back pay and the
compensatory damages portions of awards for or settlements of disparate
treatment claims were excludable under the post-1991 version of Title VII.
This version provides for compensatory damages for future pecuniary losses,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment
of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, punitive damages, and jury trials in
disparate treatment cases.
The development of the law on the taxability of ADEA awards was more
complicated. After the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court in Rickel in
1990, allowing exclusion of both back pay and liquidated damages, 57 the Tax
Court considered a number of cases arising out of United Airlines'
("United") settlement of an ADEA class action. United's company policy
required pilots to retire when they reached age 60.59 In 1979, three former
United pilots filed a class action suit under ADEA. The suit was
consolidated with another ADEA suit, brought by former United flight
engineers. A jury returned a verdict awarding the former United
employees back pay and liquidated damages. United appealed, and in 1984
the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the consolidated cases on the
63basis of erroneous jury instructions. The parties settled during the course
of the second trial; United agreed to pay each plaintiff a specific amount
designated as both back pay and liquidated damages in equal proportions.
64
In Downey v. Commissioner,65 the lead case in the settlement with United
Airlines, the Tax Court held that bifurcation of an ADEA award was not
required. However, after the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in
Burke, the Tax Court granted the IRS's motion to reconsider its decision in
55. 1993-2 C.B. 61.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). The IRS recently suspended Revenue Ruling 93-88 in
light of Schleier. I.R.S. Notice 95-45, 1995-34 I.R.B. 20.
57. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 663-64 (3d Cir. 1990).
58. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995); Gates v. Commissioner, 61
F.3d 915 (10th Cir. 1995); Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and
remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995); Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); see also Bennett v. United States, 60 F.3d 843 (Fed. Cir. 1995).







65. 97 T.C. 150 (1991).
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Downey in light of Burke. 66 The court entered a second opinion confirming
its initial holding. 67  A majority of the Tax Court concluded that ADEA
claims are distinguishable from Title VII claims because, in contrast to the
limited remedies available under pre-1991 Title VII, ADEA damages can
include liquidated damages. According to the Tax Court, liquidated
damages may compensate nonpecuniary losses or serve as a deterrent or
punishment. 68 Following the Burke direction to characterize the claim as a
whole according to the nature of relief afforded, the majority refused to treat
the liquidated and nonliquidated damages differently.
In a separate opinion, Judge Laro, joined by Judge Jacobs, argued that
the majority misconstrued Burke.69  According to Judge Laro, Burke
reaffirms prior law that the nature of the claim underlying the taxpayer's
damage award determines whether the award was received "on account of
personal injuries.,7 Thus, as stated by the Supreme Court, the statute must
redress a "tort-like personal injury" 71 for damages awarded under it to be
excludable under section 104(a)(2). Applying Treasury regulation 1.104-
1(c), 72 Judge Laro developed a two-pronged test for the exclusion of
damages received from a suit or settlement: "(1) Damages were received on
account of personal injuries, and (2) suit or action was based upon tort or
tort type rights." 73 Judge Laro concluded that ADEA is both contractual and
tort-like. He argued for bifurcation of the "tort" and "contract" components
of the plaintiff's recovery, alleging that nonliquidated damages redressed
contractual wrongs, for which back pay was awarded, and liquidated
damages redressed "tort-like" personal injuries. Thus, Judge Laro agreed
with the majority that liquidated damages were excludable but argued that
the nonliquidated damages were taxable.
Following Downey, the Tax Court decided several cases reconfirming its
holding in that case. At that time, the Tax Court followed Burke with
respect to pre-1991 Title VII cases, requiring inclusion of back pay awards.
In contrast, with respect to ADEA cases, the court allowed exclusion of the
66. See Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634, 635 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995).
67. Id. at 637.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 643 (Laro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 645.
71. Burke, 504 U.S. at 237.
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
73. Downey, 100 T.C. at 645 (Laro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994); Bums v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1994-284; Renner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-263; Guidry v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-127.
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entire award under section 104(a)(2).75 However, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the Tax Court in Downey, holding that ADEA awards are not
received on account of personal injury or sickness. 76 The Seventh Circuit
said that Burke stands for the proposition that a federal anti-discrimination
statute must provide compensatory damages for intangible elements of
personal injury for it to be "tort-like" and allow its damages to be
excluded .
Two of the cases following Downey, Schmitz v. Commissioner78 and
Commissioner v. Schleier,79 also involved parties to the United Airlines
settlement. In Schmitz, Mr. Schmitz had received a settlement of $115,050,
characterized in the agreement as consisting half of back pay and half of
liquidated damages. The Schmitzes initially had reported only the back pay
portion of the settlement as income, bifurcating the award into includable
and excludable portions as the Tax Court had done in Rickel. 80 The IRS
mailed them a notice of deficiency and they petitioned the Tax Court. After
the Third Circuit decided Rickel, they amended their petition to assert that
both portions of the award were excludable. The Tax Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Schmitzes, holding the entire award
excludable.
82
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that under its decision in United States
83v. Hawkins, Mr. Schmitz had to show both that the underlying cause of
action was "tort-like" within the meaning of Burke and that the damages
were received "on account of" the taxpayer's personal injuries. 84 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's conclusion that an ADEA claim
represents a "tort-like" cause of action because of the availability of
liquidated damages and jury trials. 85  The court disagreed with the IRS's
argument that the liquidated damages were not received "on account of" a
75. See, e.g., Fogle v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-412. At that point, the ADEA
cases were fairly uniform, with the exception of one district court case. Maleszewski v. United
States, 827 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
76. Downey, 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994).
77. Id. at 839.
78. 34 F.3d at 790.
79. No. 22909-90, 1993 WL 767976 (U.S. Tax Ct. 1993), aff'd, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir.
1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
80. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994).
84. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792.
85. Id. On June 19, 1995, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Schmitz and vacated and
remanded the Ninth Circuit's opinion for further consideration in light of Schleier. 115 S. Ct. 2573
(1995).
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86personal injury. The court found that the liquidated damages were not
solely punitive and that the damages did bear a relation to the underlying
personal injury in that they must equal the plaintiff's total pecuniary loss.
Thus, in contrast to the Seventh Circuit in Downey, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's decision. 
8
In Schleier, the taxpayer's ADEA case had been consolidated with the
class action against United Airlines. 89 Like Mr. Schmitz, Mr. Schleier had
received back pay and liquidated damages. He too had reported the back
pay as income but did not report the liquidated damages. The IRS asserted
that the liquidated damages were improperly excluded from Mr. Schleier's
income and assessed a deficiency. He contested the deficiency, and claimed
an overpayment for the amount he had paid with respect to the back pay
portion of the award. 91 The Tax Court deferred Schleier pending its
disposition of Downey.92 Following Downey, the court entered an order that
the taxpayer was entitled to a refund, but did not publish the opinion. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in
Schleier in a brief, unpublished, per curiam opinion. 93 In that opinion, the
Fifth Circuit relied entirely on its decision in Purcell v. Seguin State Bank
and Trust Co.,9a which allowed exclusion of ADEA damage awards under
the reasoning of the Tax Court's post-Burke decision in Downey.
95
C. Commissioner v. Schleier: "On Account of Personal Injuries"
Responding to the split in the circuits, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Schleier.9  The Court ruled in favor of the IRS,
reversing the Court of Appeals. 97 The Burke test of "tort or tort-type rights"
was not the focus of the opinion, although Justice O'Connor argued
convincingly in her dissent in Schleier that Burke was intended to be the
86. The court noted that the IRS did not argue that the back pay was not received "on account
of" a personal injury. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 794 n.4.
87. Id. at 795.
88. Id. at 791.
89. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (1995).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 97 T.C. 150 (1991), opinion supplemented by, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836
(7th Cir. 1994).
93. 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curian) (unpublished).
94. 999 F.2d 950, 961 (5th Cir. 1993).
95. Id. at 961.
96. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
97. Id. at 2162.
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definitive interpretation of the requisite elements for exclusion under section
98104(a)(2). She quoted the majority opinion in Burke as illustrating the
understanding the majority shared with the entire Court, that "the scope of §
104(a)(2) is defined in terms of traditional tort principles." 99  However,
Justice Stevens, writing for a five-Justice majority, created a new hurdle in
the statute, focusing on the phrase "on account of," similar to the Ninth
Circuit's approach in Schmitz. 1°° Justice Stevens found that the damages
considered in Schleier for United's violation of ADEA were not received
"on account of' personal injuries. 101
In ruling for the IRS, the majority purported to agree with the dissent that
the "intangible harms of discrimination" constitute "personal injuries." 102
However, the Court stated that neither Schleier's sixtieth birthday nor his
discharge from United Airlines were "personal injuries or sickness."10 3 The
Court held that back pay awarded under ADEA does not actually
compensate plaintiffs for the intangible harms of discrimination, 104 but
presumably for the discharge, so Mr. Schleier's damages were not received
on account of a personal injury. The Court noted that the amount of back
pay is "completely independent of the existence or extent of any personal
injury. ,105
The Court did not hold that back pay is always gross income. Instead,
the majority contrasted awards of back pay paid "on account of personal
injuries or sickness," with back pay paid on account of something else, even
where the recipient of that back pay suffered personal injuries caused by the
payor. 11 The majority's example was that of an automobile accident
involving various injuries to the taxpayer. °7  If the taxpayer settles a
resulting lawsuit for $30,000, the entire amount would be excludable under
Section 104(a)(2), assuming the taxpayer has not previously deducted the
medical expenses. According to the Court, "[t]he medical expenses for
injuries arising out of the accident clearly constitute damages received 'on
account of personal injuries. '" 10 8  The portion compensating pain and
suffering also constitutes such damages. Finally, the portion paid for back
98. Id. at 2167 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2171.
100. See supra text accompanying note 84.
101. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162.
102. Id. at 2165 n.6.
103. Id. at 2164.
104. Id. at 2165 n.6.
105. Id. at 2164.
106. Id. at 2163.
107. Id. at 2164.
108. Id.
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wages is also "on account of personal injuries" if the taxpayer was out of
work as a result of his injuries. 1 9  The Court cited a hypothetical in
Threlkeld where a surgeon, who loses his finger as a result of the tortfeasor's
actions, is allowed to exclude any recovery for lost wages because these are
special damages paid on account of the injury. 110 The majority opinion thus
seemed to state that damages are awarded "on account of" personal injury
only where the damages are awarded for consequences of the personal injury
itself. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's two-part test would seem to
require looking first at the nature of the claim under Burke and then at its
consequences under Schleier.
Justice O'Connor responded to the majority's hypothetical by arguing that
a distinction between wages lost due to a car crash and wages lost due to
illegal discrimination is significant only if personal injuries are read to
include only tangible injuries, as Justice Scalia did in Burke."' In Footnote
six, the majority answered the dissent's charge that the Court "assume[d]
that the intangible harms of discrimination do not constitute personal
injuries, " 112 stating, "[wie of course have no doubt that compensation for
such harms may be excludable under § 104(a)(2). However, to acknowledge
that discrimination may cause intangible harms is not to say that the ADEA
compensates for such harms or that any of the damages received were on
account of those harms. " 113 It is hard to reconcile these two sentences.
Perhaps the majority has left open the door for lower courts to hold that Title
VII recoveries are excludable under section 104(a)(2), even though ADEA
recoveries are not.
In deciding Schleier, Justice Stevens also had to confront Treasury
regulation 1.104-1(c), the focus of Burke, which seems to allow the
exclusion of any damages received through the prosecution of a suit based on
tort or tort-type rights. 114 Justice Stevens argued that the IRS's interpretation
of the Treasury regulation had not been consistent, and that the IRS correctly
argued in its brief that the regulation was not intended to eliminate the "on
account of" requirement of section 104(a)(2).1 5 However, Justice O'Connor
countered that for thirty-five years, including in its briefs in Burke and in its
opening brief in Schleier, the IRS consistently interpreted the Treasury
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1300 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81
(6th Cir. 1988)).
111. Id. at 2167 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2165 n.6.
113. Id.
114. See supra text accompanying note 40.
115. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166 n.7.
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regulation as conclusively establishing the requirements under section
104(a)(2). 116 According to Justice O'Connor, only one sentence in the IRS's
reply brief expressed the view adopted by the Supreme Court as the basis of
its holding.' 7 Justice Stevens also chose not to follow Revenue Ruling 93-
88, which supported the taxpayer, stating that "interpretive rulings. do not
have the force and effect of regulations."" 8 Instead, Justice Stevens adopted
a two-part test from the IRS's brief, similar to that devised by Judge Laro in
his dissent in Downey. 119 The claim must be for a "tort-like" personal injury
and the damages must be awarded "on account of' that injury.120
Perhaps in response to Justice O'Connor's arguments that Burke was
meant to be the sole test of excludability under section 104(a)(2), Justice
Stevens addressed the Burke issue. 121 The Court held that ADEA fails the
Burke test of "tort or tort-type rights" because it provides only back wages,
which are economic in nature, and liquidated damages. The Court accepted
the IRS's argument that liquidated damages are essentially punitive.122 The
majority found that ADEA does not compensate "any of the other traditional
harms associated with personal injury. " 123 Presumably the Court was
referring to compensatory damages such as medical expenses and damages
for pain and suffering. Although in Burke the Court focused on the
availability of a broad spectrum of damages, including punitive and
compensatory damages, in Schleier, the Court's alternative holding was
apparently that punitive-type damages are not sufficient to make a statute
"tort-like."'1 24  Justice O'Connor's position was that "age discrimination
inflicts a personal injury."' 25 She argued that even after Burke, the damages
received under ADEA are "on account of' that injury. 126  In her dissent,
Justice O'Connor argued convincingly that ADEA meets the Burke test of
116. Id. at 2171 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2167 n.8 (quoting Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990)).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
120. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
121. Id. at 2162. This is perhaps the most troubling aspect of Schleier. If Burke did not
consider the "on account of" language because pre-1991 Title VII recoveries failed the "personal
injury" prong of § 104(a)(2), why does Schleier need to consider "on account of" if ADEA
recoveries also fail the "personal injury" prong? More likely, the shift in focus from "personal
injury" to "on account of" reflects the 1995 Court's dissatisfaction with the prior test, which made
more employment discrimination awards potentially excludable.
122. Id. at 2161 (citing Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985)).
123. Id. at 2166.
124. Burke, 504 U.S. at 235; Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
125. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
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"tort-like" remedies in that it authorizes a range of damages. 127 She further
argued that liquidated damages, if characterized as punitive, support the tort-
like characterization because punitive damages can be awarded only in
tort. 12  In addition, ADEA authorizes "such legal or equitable relief as will
effectuate the purposes" of the Act.' 29 Furthermore, ADEA affords a jury
trial, something the majority in Burke suggested might affect the analysis. 130
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Schleier is troubling in that it holds ADEA awards includable despite
Burke. It is difficult to counter Judge Stevens' argument that the Treasury
regulation cannot eliminate a statutory requirement. Much less clear is
whether the regulation was meant to establish all of the requirements of
section 104(a)(2), and if so, what deference the Court owes the regulation.
The ouestion of deference to administrative interpretation, though never
easy, is complicated where the agency disavows its prior interpretation.
Had the Court been writing on a clean slate, Schleier might make more
sense, but instead the Court has added a "consequences" layer to an "origin
and character" test.
Schleier incorporates another level of inquiry into any analysis of
excludability of employment discrimination damages. Under Burke, the
underlying cause of action must be sufficiently "tort-like" to qualify under
the Treasury regulation.' 32  According to the Court, pre-1991 Title VII
recoveries as well as ADEA recoveries fail on that basis. Under Schleier,
the focus is on whether the damages were received "on account
of ... personal injuries or sickness."' 34 The majority breathed separate life
into the phrase "on account of." Thus, after Schleier, only where a statute
compensates for the specific intangible harms caused by the illegal activity,
127. Id. at 2170-71.
128. Id. at 2170.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1988).
130. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 238.
131. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749
(1995).
132. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 237 (1992).
133. Commissioner v. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (1995) (alternative holding) (referring
to ADEA awards); Burke, 504 U.S. at 241 n.12 (pre-1991 Title VII awards).
134. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
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not just a wrongful discharge, for example, will recoveries for discharge on
the basis of age, race, religion, or gender be excludable. 35
Schleier, which denied excludability, did not take the next step and
specify how excludability would be determined where a plaintiff receives an
award under a statute allowing compensatory damages for the intangible
harms of employment discrimination. For example, after the 1991
amendments, Title VII offers a wide range of possible damages to victims of
intentional discrimination, including compensatory damages for "future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses."136 Even though
the post-1991 Title VII apparently meets the Burke test, 137 a plaintiff who
recovers only back pay after prosecuting a Title VII claim presumably
cannot exclude it because back pay would fail the Schleier test. That is,
under Schleier, back pay probably is not awarded "on account of" the
intangible personal injury caused by prohibited discrimination.'
38
However, after Burke and Schleier, if a post-1991 Title VII plaintiff
receives both back pay and compensatory damages for emotional pain and
mental anguish, the exclusion question is less clear. Under the Burke
characterization of the claim as a whole, 1 39 post-1991 Title VII claims should
be sufficiently "tort-like." Under Schleier, the damages received on account
of economic injuries probably are not "tort-like" because those damages are
not received "on account of" a personal injury. The more difficult question
is whether the damages received as compensation for the emotional pain and
mental anguish of discrimination would be excludable. Under Schleier, they
seem to be received "on account of" intangible personal injuries.
Although Burke requires characterizing the claim as a whole, it does not
seem to prohibit separating damages into excludable and includable portions
according to whether or not they meet the Schleier test. Thus, the best
answer under the case law may be to allow exclusion of only the personal
135. Since Schleier, two circuits have reversed lower court decisions in cases involving former
United Airlines pilots and held ADEA damages taxable. Bennett v. United States, 76 A.F.T.R.2d
95-5070 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Estate of Hillelson v. Commissioner, 76 A.F.T.R.2d 95-5205 (11th
Cir. 1995).
136. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1977A(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
137. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 241 n.12.
138. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
139. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 237 n.7 (noting that appropriate inquiry involves the nature of the
claim underlying the award, not solely the availability of various types of awards).
140. Perhaps this is the meaning of Footnote 6 in Schleier. See text accompanying notes 112-
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injury portion of the recovery received under a statute that passes the Burke
test.
Another interesting implication of Schleier is that it may have indirectly
resolved an issue regarding the excludability of punitive damages. A 1989
amendment to section 104(a) provides that paragraph (2) is inapplicable to
punitive damages received after July 10, 1989 "in connection with a case not
involving physical injury or physical sickness. "141 It is unclear whether this
means that punitive damages are excludable in cases that do involve physical
injury or sickness. 142 In Schleier, the Court analogized liquidated damages
to punitive damages and held that they were not paid "on account of' the
intangible personal injury to Mr. Schleier. 143  If that is the case, it would
seem that even in a physical injury case, punitive damages are not paid "on
account of" that injury. The Court may not have intended this conclusion
but it seems implicit in the Court's reasoning. 144
V. CONCLUSION
Schleier is a somewhat surprising decision, particularly after the Court's
recent decision in Burke, which seemed to limit the test under section
104(a)(2) to the "tort-like" nature of the cause of action, based on its
remedies. The Schleier majority distinguishes Burke on the ground that it
only interpreted the phrase "damages received" and applied the Treasury
regulation. 145 However, Justice O'Connor points out the broad language in
141. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 § 7641(a) (1989) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 104(a) (1996)).
142. See Craig Day, Taxation of Punitive Damages: Interpreting Section 104(a)(2) After the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1029-32 (1991); Joseph M. Dodge,
Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 143 (1992); James Serven, The Taxation of Punitive
Damages: Horton Lays an Egg?, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 215, 260-266 (1995). The United States
Supreme Court is expected to decide the issue of excludability of at least pre-1989 punitive damage
awards in O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3639 (Mar. 25, 1996). In O'Gilvie, a jury awarded Mrs. O'Gilvie's estate $10 million in a product
liability action after she died of toxic shock syndrome. Id. at 1552. The taxpayers each received
his or her share of the award in 1988. Id. Currently, there is a split in the circuits on the
excludability of pre-1989 punitive damage awards. Compare O'Gilvie (includable) and Wesson v.
United States, 48 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1995) (includable) and Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d
1077 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995) (includable) and Reese v. United States,
24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (includable) and Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir.
1990) (includable) with Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1994) (excludable).
143. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2165 n.6 (1995).
144. Cf. O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d at 1557 (noting that Schleier made it clear that Horton, which
found punitive damages excludable, misconstrued Burke as holding that § 104(a)(2) requires only a
"tort-like" injury).
145. See Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2167.
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Burke that appeared to resolve all of the elements necessary for exclusion
under section 104(a)(2), not just one of several conditions. 1
46
The result in Schleier is understandable, even defensible. If employment
discrimination inflicts an injury that is primarily economic, tax policy
counsels inclusion of the damages. However, Schleier does not sit well with
Burke, and the rationale of Schleier is troubling. Justice Stevens' majority
opinion in Schleier seems to go through contortions in order to reach a
conclusion that does not directly overrule Burke. In addition, Schleier
reflects the Court's unwillingness to pay deference to the IRS's longstanding
interpretation of a statute, at least when the IRS argues for a different
approach. 147
In the post-Glenshaw Glass world, 148 it is hard to rationalize section
104(a)(2). Congress' original intent probably was to limit the exclusion to
physical or mental health injuries, as Justice Scalia explained in his
concurrence in Burke. 149  However, Congress rejected a bill in 1989 that
would have so limited section 104(a)(2). °  If the courts extend section
104(a)(2) to nonphysical injuries such as libel, there seems to be no
compellin 11reason to exclude employment discrimination damages from its
coverage.
The application of section 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination
damages received with respect to cases under statutes other than ADEA and
pre-1991 Title VII remains unclear. Schleier has created doubt regarding the
excludability of employment discrimination recoveries under a statute
146. Id. at 2171 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Similarly, in Commissioner v. Lundy, the Supreme Court gave no weight to the
taxpayer's argument that the IRS had receded from a generous approach in interpreting a statute.
116 S. Ct 647 (1996); see also Respondent's Brief in Lundy, LEXIS 95 TNT 190-52, (Sept. 28,
1995); cf. Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service to Be
Consistent?, 40 TAx L. REV. 411, 417 (1985) ("if the court believed the proper interpretation of
the law was that advanced by the Service in the present litigation, and that the Service's precedents
and the position of the taxpayer were wrong, then, the court could enforce a duty of consistency
only at the cost of not following its interpretation of the Code").
148. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
149. Burke, 504 U.S. at 243-44 (Scalia, J., concurring). Congress lent some implicit support
for the conclusion that § 104(a)(2) applies to nonphysical injuries when it amended § 104 in 1989 to
provide that § 104(a)(2) is inapplicable to punitive damages received after July 10, 1989 "in
connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
(1989). Presumably, Congress would have rendered § 104(a)(2) applicable to all damages for
nonphysical injuries, not just punitive damages, had it so desired. However, the bill appears to
reflect a compromise between the House bill, which would have limited the scope of § 104(a)(2) to
physical injuries, and the Senate bill, which contained no provision. See Cochran, supra note 8, at
53-54.
150. See supra note 149.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
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providing a broad range of damages, like post-1991 Title. VII. The worst
possible situation is confusion because knowledge of the tax treatment of
damages may affect settlement negotiations.'
52
152. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Perhaps in response to this uncertainty, on September 19, 1995, the House Ways and Means
Committee approved the Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1995. See Revenue Reconciliation Bill of
1995, 82 STANDARD FEDERAL TAX REPORTS 44 (2d extra ed. Oct. 2, 1995). The Revenue
Reconciliation Bill included provisions providing that all punitive damages paid as a result of
personal injuries would be taxable. See H.R. 2517, 104th Cong, 1st Sess. Title XIII, § 13611
(1995) (The Revenue Reconciliation Bill text was included as Title 13 of the Seven Year Balanced
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995 in House Bill 2517.). Other personal injury damages would be
excludable only if received on account of physical injury or physical sickness. Id. These changes
would have been effective for amounts received after 1995, subject to a transitional rule for
agreements, court decrees or awards in effect on September 13, 1995. Id. If these changes were
enacted, they would resolve the Schleier confusion, but only prospectively. However, the Revenue
Reconciliation Bill was included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995, which was
vetoed by President Clinton on December 6, 1995. See H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995).
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